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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------~--~------~-----------~-~---------------------------
JO ELLEN RAY, fna JO ELLEN ) 
THOMAS, and STATE OF UTAH, by ) 
and through Utah State ) 
Department of Social Services, ) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ~ Case No. 18316 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
EDWARD THOMAS, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
--~~----~-~--~----~-----------------~--~--------~-~---~-----~---
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for reimbursement for child support 
accrued under a Decree o·f Divorce. Reimbursement is sought 
from the support obliger (appellant) by the State of Utah for 
periods of time that the support obligee received public assist-
ance from the State of Utah and assigned to the State of Utah 
the child support due under the Decree of Divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The State of Utah intervened in the divorce proceeding 
and filed an Order to Show Cause seeking reimbursement for 
certain periods. An evidentiary hearing was conducted by the 
Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge. After considering the 
evidence adduced, Judge Gould awarded the State of Utah judgment 
in the sum of $3,975.00 as reimbursement for child support 
accrued during the periods public assistance was expended for 
the benefit of Edward Thomas' dependant minor children. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the Lower Court's 
Order and Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal has been 
filed in this case pursuant to Rule 73(o), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedureo Additionally, copies of Judge Gould's Memorandum 
Decision and the Order and Judgment entered by the Lower Court 
are part of record on appeal. The Agreed Statement of Record 
on Appeal are hereinafter referred to by the paragraph numbers 
of that Statement. 
The Decree of Divorce entered February 8, 1974, 
provided that the appellant pay $50.00 per month per child for 
the support of his two dependant minor children (~l and 2). 
Prior to June, 1976, the State of Utah had expended public 
assistance for the benefit of the children and sought reim-
bursement for child support accrued at a hearing on Order to 
Show Cause June 22, 1976 (,[3). At the hearing, the appellant 
contested the amount sought by the State of Utah, representing 
that payments had been made directly to his ex-wife (,[4). 
The Court ordered at that time, upon the specific request of 
the State of Utah to avoid confusion in the future, that the 
appellant pay a~l further child support through the Clerk of 
the Court (,[5). The appellant ignored that order; he only 
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made one payment to the Clerk in 1976 (August) and did not 
pay through the Clerk again until December, 1980 ( ~r6) . The 
Court's order that payment be made through the Clerk was not 
modified or changed. The. only explanation that the appellant 
made for not having the Clerk's record to verify his alleged 
payments was his claim that his ex-wife had asked that payments 
be made directly to her ( ,r 13) . 
For various periods June, 1976, through December, 
1981, the State of Utah expended public assistance for the 
benefit of the minor children of appellant. Said assistance 
June, 1976 through 
was provided for 40 months, I December, 1981; during the re-
maining 27 months, the appellant's ex-wife did not receive 
:public ~ssi~tance and was entitled~~o coll~ct the support due 
individually (,(7). At the evidentiary hearing held on the 
State of Utah's Order to Show Cause on December 28, 1981, the 
issue was child support paid by appellant during the 40 months 
for which public assistance had been expended on behalf of the 
children. The appellant testified that he had made the re-
quired payment for every month in question (~[11), but did not 
have documentation for any of the claimed payments, except for 
those payments made to the Clerk in August, 1976, and subsequent 
to December, 1980 (,( 14,10). Jo Ellen Ray testified that the 
appellant had not paid her for every month in question; she 
did recall receiving some payments from the appellant, but 
did not recall the amounts or whether the payments were made 
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during one of the 40 months she was a public assistance 
recipient or during· one of the 27 months she was not a public 
assistance recipient (,r 15, 16, 17). The total child support 
accrued during the periods public assistance was expended, 
[including that under the modified order (~ 8)],less total 
payments verified (,I 10), equalled $3,975.00 (~[ 11). 
Judgment was awarded the State of Utah in the sum 
of $3,975.00 and no credits were allowed to the appellant for 
payments which he orally testified were made but for which 
he did not have verification. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: ORAL TESTIMONY OF THE 
SUPPORT OBLIGOR IS NOT SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH PAYMENT OF A SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION. 
Appellant argues that the trial court (a) ignored 
appellant's oral testimony; (b) gave appellant's oral testimony 
no weight whatsoever; and (c) in essense held appellant to be 
an incompetent witness. Respondents disagree. In his 
Memorandum Decision, Judge Gould stated: 
The Court is under more severe restrictions 
in fact-finding in a case of this nature than 
in an ordinary civil case. Ordinarily, the 
oral testimony of a single witness (if believed) 
is sufficient for the proof of a fact. Such, 
however, is not the rule in the case at bar. 
Under rules which must be applied in accordance 
with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, de-
fendant's efforts to prove payments by oral 
testimony must fail. The proof of payment 
having failed, it follows that plaintiffs are 
entitled to judgment for $3,975.00 
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While respondents agree with appellant that there is 
not a case directly on point, respondents submit that the 
implicit rule of law, understood by both support obligors and 
the Bar and employed by the Utah Supreme Court in its decisions, 
is that oral testimony by a support obliger is not sufficient 
to establish payment of a support obligationo Judge Gould 
correctly follows such decisions in making the above-quoted order. 
Contrary to appellant's position that cases decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court provide "little, if any, guidance", several 
prior cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court clearly state the 
rule and standard used by Judge Gould. 
In 1931, Margaret Openshaw obtained a decree of 
divorce dissolving her marriage to Clarence R. Openshaw. Four 
different appeals arising from the decree were taken to the 
Utah Supreme Court, in addition to several other related appeals. 
In the first appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 
364 (1932) , the use of the term "alimony" in the decree is 
clarified to include support for Margaret and the children. 
Hence, in referring to "alimony" in its decisions, the Court 
was ref erring to both spousal and child support and not setting 
one against the other as suggested on page 5 of Appellant's 
Brief. The Openshaw cases clearly deal with child support; 
however, respondents submit that the issue raised by this appeal 
applies to both spousal support and child support and no dis-
tinction need, nor should, be made. 
-5-
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The question of Clarence R. Openshaw's compliance 
with the order of support was raised in the second appeal. 
In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191 (1935), 
Mrs. Openshaw admitted that she received payments totalling 
$2,374.00 and Mr. Openshaw received credit accordingly. However, 
Mro Openshaw asserted other payments made by him. The specifics 
regarding these other payments is not stated in the opinion, 
but at 42 p,.2d, page 193, the Court stated: 
As to the other payments alleged to have 
been made by him, though they were admitted 
as having been received, they were so un-
certain in amount that to fix their total 
would be speculative. The brirden being upon 
the defendant to establish the amount paid, 
he must assume the risk of any failure by 
reason of indefiniteness. The payments to 
the children themselves do not appear to have 
been made as payments upon alimony, but were 
rather the result of his fatherly interest 
in the welfare of those children. 
This sets a standard for establishing support payments, to 
wit: 
(a) the amount of payment must be certain so 
that fixing the total paid is not speculation~ 
(b) the support obliger bears the burden of 
proving the amount paid; and 
(c) the support obliger assumes the risk of 
any failure in payment by reason of indefiniteness. 
Just as Mrs. Openshaw admitted to having received the other 
payments, Jo Ellen Ray agreed that she received some payments 
but was uncertain as to the amount or frequency of the payments 
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or the month of payment [Agreed Statement of Record on 
Appeal, ,Jl5, 16]. However, in weighing the testimony of the 
appellant and Jo Ellen Ray, the trial court determined that 
fixing payments would be speculative and that appellant 
failed to carry his burden of proof and was required to assume 
the risk for the indefiniteness in payment made. The trial 
court correctly applied the standard set forth in the Openshaw 
(second) case. 
In the fourth appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 
574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), it is clear that Mr. Openshaw under-
stood the implicit rule of law that support payments must be 
verified and establ-ished by evidence other than the oral 
testimony of the support obliger. Mr. Openshaw had attempted 
to perpetrate fraud upon the court by submitting checks (verif i-
cation) which had been altered as to the amounts, the payee 
and the dates. It is important to note that Mr. Openshaw went 
to the extent of committing fraud upon the court to prove pay-
ments by cancelled check rather than to rely upon naked oral 
testimony as to payment. 
Placing the burden of proving payments upon the 
party asserting payment is a general rule applicable to all 
civil actions [for example, see: Bell v. Jones, 100 Utah 87, 
110 P.2d 327 (1941)]. The rule was followed, and amplified, 
in the case Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P.2d 207 (1940). 
In this case, the defendant had alleged, among other credits, 
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The question of Clarence R. Openshaw's compliance 
with the order of support was raised in the second appeal. 
In Openshaw Vs Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191 (1935), 
Mrs. Openshaw admitted that she received payments totalling 
$2,374.00 and Mr. Openshaw received credit accordingly. However, 
Mro Openshaw asserted other payments made by him. The specifics 
regarding these other payments is not stated in the opinion, 
but at 42 P·e2d, page 193, the Court stated: 
As to the other payments alleged to have 
been made by him, though they were admitted 
as having been received, they were so un-
certain in amount that to fix their total 
would be speculative. The burden being upon 
the defendant to establish the amount paid, 
he must assume the risk of any failure by 
reason of indefiniteness. The payments to 
the children themselves do not appear to have 
been made as payments upon alimony, but were 
rather the result of his fatherly interest 
in the welfare of those children. 
This sets a standard for establishing support payments, to 
wit: 
(a} the amount of payment must be certain so 
that fixing the total paid is not speculation; 
(b} the support obliger bears the burden of 
proving the amount paid; and 
(c) the support obliger assumes the risk of 
any failure in payment by reason of indefiniteness. 
Just as Mrs. Openshaw admitted to having received the other 
payments, Jo Ellen Ray agreed that she received some payments 
but was uncertain as to the amount or frequency of the payments 
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or the month of payment [Agreed Statement of Record on 
Appeal, ,(15, 16]. However, in weighing the testimony of the 
appellant and Jo Ellen Ray, the trial court determined that 
fixing payments would be speculative and that appellant 
failed to carry his burden of proof and was required to assume 
the risk for the indefiniteness in payment made. The trial 
court correctly applied the standard set forth in the Openshaw 
(second) case. 
In the fourth appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 
574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), it is clear that Mr. Openshaw under-
stood the implicit rule of law that support payments must be 
verified and established by evidence other than the oral 
testimony of the support obliger. Mr. Openshaw had attempted 
to perpetrate fraud upon the court by submitting checks (verifi-
cation) which had been altered as to the amounts, the payee 
and the dates. It is important to note that Mr. Openshaw went 
to the extent of committing fraud upon the court to prove pay-
ments by cancelled check rather than to rely upon naked oral 
testimony as to payment. 
Placing the burden of proving payments upon the 
-
party asserting payment is a general rule applicable to all 
civil actions [for example, see: Bell v. Jones, 100 Utah 87, 
110 P.2d 327 (1941)]. The rule was followed, and amplified, 
in the case Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P.2d 207 (1940). 
In this case, the defendant had alleged, among other credits, 
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payments for which he had not been credited by the plaintiff e 
In ruling on the issues before it, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated at 100 P.2d, page 210: 
It is well settled that payment is an 
affirmative defense, and that the party claim-
ing payment has the burden of proving it [citations 
omitted]. This rule should especially apply to 
cases of this kind, where the debtor can always, 
or is usually ordered to, make his payment into 
court, where a record is kept, thereby eliminating 
any chance of dispute. 
The Court then quoted from the Openshaw case, 
42 p.2d, at page 193, quoted above. Concerning the payments 
which the defendant claimed to have paid the plaintiff in small 
sums and cash, he introduced a check, a sender's receipt for 
a money order, and a receipt signed by the plaintiff. The 
Utah Supreme Court determined that the endorsement on the check 
was not the plaintiff '·s handwriting, and credit was not allowed. 
As to the sender's receipt, the Utah Supreme Court determined 
that it was a gift to the son rather than a pqyment of alimony 
and did not allow the credit. The receipt was allowed, as well 
as another small check admitted to having been received by the 
plaintiff. The Court did not allow him credit for any payments 
he could not verify by evidence other than oral testimony. It 
is implicit in the Supreme Court's discussion of these payments 
and the defendant's proffer of evidence other than oral testimony 
that the burden of proof placed upon a support obliger requires 
verification. 
Verification can be made by (a) the support obligee's 
admission that the alleged payments were made; (b) a receipt 
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signed by the support obligee; (c) a sender's copy of a 
money order; (d) a cancelled check or other negotiable in-
strument; (e) court records; or (f) any other document showing 
receipt of monies by the support obligeeo 
Two other things are important to note from the 
Marks case. First, the trial court had originally placed the 
burden of non-payment on the plaintiff. This was over-turned 
by the Supreme Court and at 100 P.2d, page 210, the Supreme 
Court indicated that if the evidence was evenly balanced, 
judgment should be awarded in favor of the plaintiff. Second, 
from the language quoted above, i.e., "This rule should es-
pecially apply to cases of this kind (emphasis added), where 
the debtor can always, and is usually ordered to, make payments 
into court, where a record is kept, thereby eliminating any 
chance for dispute", a distinction is made between support 
cases and other civil cases. At the June 22, 1976, hearing, 
the appellant was cited into court by the State of Utah. The 
appellant was present and it was clear that the child support 
was due to the State of Utah and the State of Utah wanted pay-
ment through the Clerk to avoid future confusion. The Clerk 
of the Court was not refusing to accept payments from the 
appellant. Jo Ellen Ray denied that she made a request for 
direct payments. This case demonstrates the importance of 
making payments through the Clerk of the Court. The order to 
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pay through the Clerk was not modified or alteredc The 
appellant violated the Court's direct order and assumed the 
risk of having not made payments through the Clerk of the Court 
and, therefore, not being otherwise able to verify payments 
except for his own naked assertions; the appellant should not now 
be excused for violating the specific order concerning payments 
to the Clerk of the Court. 
In the case Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979), 
the support obliger made several different claims of payments. 
After discussing these specific claimed credits, the Supreme 
Court at page 604 commented on other credits claimed and restated 
the rule that the support obliger has the burden of proving 
~~~. -4-t?,-=:~~- - -- - -~---
payments and assumes the risk of indefiniteness: 
Other amounts for which plaintiff 
claims credit were so uncertain as to 
amount or actual expenditure as to be 
highly speculative, and were paid out of 
either a joint checking account which he 
had with defendant or his own account 
into which defendant deposited her pay-
checks during that period of time when 
the parties attempted reconciliation. 
Plaintiff has not met his burden of 
proving that these expenditures were 
made by him. We therefore do not find 
that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the Court's finding that plaintiff 
paid only $7,024.00 in child support under 
the decree. 
It is clear from the above decisions that oral 
testimony is not sufficient to meet the burden of proof required 
of the support obliger. The lower court did rule that alleged 
payments by appellant were not made. The trial court considered 
both the testimony of payment and the testimony of non-payment 
-10-
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and, in weighing the same, concluded that the evidence did 
not preponderate in favor of the appellant. Hence, the trial 
court ruled that the appellant had not met his burden of proof, and 
did not rule tantamount to saying the appellant was not a 
competent witness. Section 78-24-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, which is relied upon by appellant, provides that 
the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question by 
various factors, including his motives, and provides that the 
trier of fact is the exclusive judge of credibility. Judge 
Gould heard the testimony and weighed the statements of the 
witnesses. It resulted in a question of whom to believe and 
the court's decision, that the _weight of evidence was against 
the appellant, should not be overruled on this appeal. Although 
not stated in Judge Gould's decision, the motive of the appel-
lant to avoid repaying a substantial arrearage illustrates why 
the standard of proof set forth in the cited cases and the 
implicit rule of law is sound and should be affirmatively 
stated in upholding Judge Gould's decision on this appeal. 
The question of a witness' motive and its be~ring on a support 
case is more specifically addressed under Point II. 
POINT II: PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES 
THAT PAYMENT OF A SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
BE VERIFIED. 
Two well recognized principles concerning oral testimony 
are, first, that the trier of fact is not required to believe 
self-serving testimony [see for example: Jensen v. Logan City, 
96 Utah 522, 88 P.2d 459 {1939)], and, second, that if testimony 
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is given and no other evidence is offered to the contrary, the 
trier of fact is not required to find in accordance with the 
testimony [see for example: Moore Vo Prudential Insurance Co:. 
of America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971)] e These are 
not rules which are tantamount to saying that the witness is 
incompetent. These principles apply to all civil cases; however, 
in a support case even more restrictive principles should apply. 
To rule that in a support case the trier of fact is not required 
to give credit for payments established only by the testimony 
of the support obligor is consistent with, and mandated, by 
public policy. 
The paramount consideration is that if a support obliger 
can merely come to a hearing and orally assert payments, without 
verification by clerk record, cancelled check, receipt, etc., no 
support obliger would ever again be delinquent! The support 
obliger could merely testify that he made all required payments 
in cash and obtain an order that he is current in his obligation. 
Such a possiblity would spawn and encourage perjury. As a matter 
of public policy, even the temptation of perjury should be avoided. 
Although perjury is a problem for any witness, the inducement for 
perjury to avoid paying support for such a large population of 
similarly situated individuals is claerly contrary to public 
policy, especially where such perjury can be controlled, or even 
avoided, by requiring proper verification of payments. Further, 
the possibility that mere oral testimony could satisfy the burden 
of proving payment would make a mocke.ry of the inalienable duties 
to provide support. It would in,most cases be the needy, minor 
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children who would suffer from the wholesale opportunity of 
support obligors to be declared current merely because they said 
so. 
An additional consideration is the chaos and burden upon 
the courts. Since support cases are heard before judges as the 
. . 
trier of fact, an extreme burden would be placed upon the judiciary 
if oral testimony alone could establish payment of a support 
obligation. While our legal system is based upon the trier of fact 
deciding who is telling the truth, in S1:lpport cases this would be to 
an inordinate extreme. In case after case after case the testimony 
of the support obligee would be pitted against the testimony of the 
support obliger -- in some cases payment may have actually been made, 
but credit not given, in others it may be given; yet in many other 
cases (too many) payment will not have actually been made, but 
credit given. The judiciary would be placed in the chaotic state 
of making coin-flips. There is no reason for such a nightmare when 
the reasonable and functional alternative is to require verification 
of payments. 
These public policy considerations can be extended even 
further to the welfare setting where collusion could result, e.g.: 
the support obligee would receive welfare and then agree, be 
threatened, coerced or whatever to co~operate with the support 
him 
obliger in getting/off-the-hook with the State of Utah; or, more 
importantly, the support obliger could have received payment, but 
deny the same to avoid hisown welfare fraud. Also, the support obliger 
could merely assert payment in cash and further assert that the 
~upport obliger did not, or would not, give him a receipt because 
he did not want to be caught in welfare fraud; if the testimony 
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were accepted, the support obliger does not have to pay the 
accrual and the State of Utah could never prove the welfare 
fraud since the support obligee'stestimony was that payment 
was not received - for a ruling of payment in one instance, 
is not a ruling of fraud in another instance. Hence, contrary 
to the interests of the taxpayers in the State of Utah, the 
State of Utah would be unable to collect from either party. 
A rule requiring proof of payment by other than oral testimony 
protects the support obligee, the benefactors of the support debt 
and any third party who comes to the aid of the support obligee 
and the dependant minor children. 
To flatly state that oral testimony alone will not 
fulfill the burden of proving payment in a support case may 
appear harsh at first g1anceo However, support obligors can 
very easily protect themselves from double payments by paying 
by check, by money order, through the Court Clerk or insisting 
upon a receipt. Such is not in any way onerous; in fact, such 
has been the implicit rule of law followed by support obligors 
in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
The burden of proving payments is placed upon the 
person ordered to make payments. That person can assure 
proper credit for all payments by requiring a receipt, paying 
by check, or preferably paying to the Clerk of the Court. In 
the matter before the Court, Mr. Thomas was specifically 
ordered to pay thr~ugh the Clerk of the Court and he violated 
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that order. He assumed the risk of any failure to prove payments 
by not making payments through the Clerk of the Court. Estab-
lishing his payments was speculation and a search in the pararn-
eters of indefiniteness. As a general principle, he, nor any 
other support obliger should not be allowed to merely take the 
witness stand and say, "I paid every month. I am 100% current. 
I paid in cash, and due to trust or an oversight, failed to 
get a receipt for my cash," when the same is denied by the 
equally competent testimony of the support obligee. While oral 
testimony may initially satisfy the burden of producing evidence, 
once that testimony is refuted by the support obligee, the 
burden shifts back_to the support obliger to go forward·with 
evidence beyond mere naked statement of cash payment. The 
support obliger is required to demonstrate definite payment by 
some means of verification. Since this shifting of the burden 
of proof is standard in all support cases, the steps of the 
the 
support obliger's testimony of payment and/support obligee's 
testimony of nonpayment should not be necessary -- the rule 
should be made that oral testimony alone will not meet the 
. . 
burden of proving payments by a support obliger. Such a rule 
would not preclude the support obliger for soliciting the 
testimony of the support obligee in an effort to establish 
payment through the support obligee's testimony; but, upon the 
support obligee denying the claimed payments, would require 
the support obliger to come forward with verification of pay-
ment. The public policy considerations set forth above mandate 
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such a rulee 
In the instant case, appellant failed to meet the 
burden of procf and because of the indefiniteness created 
thereby the decision of the lower court was correct and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
( 
Deputy Weber County At o 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the Off ice of counsel for 
Appellant, Bruce R. Baird, 310 S. Main St., 12th Floor, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of August, 1982. 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
